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In the wake of 9/11, the war in Iraq and terrorist attacks in London and Glasgow, the 
activities of the intelligence and security agencies (MI5, MI6 and GCHQ) and the way 
in which intelligence is handled by governments have become issues of widespread 
concern and importance. Yet, until relatively recently intelligence and security matters 
have not been subject to parliamentary scrutiny or debate. From the 1980s the veil of 
secrecy which had surrounded the intelligence and security agencies has gradually 
been lifted, with legislation, including the Security Service Act 1989 and the 
Intelligence Services Act 1994, placing the agencies and their activities on a statutory 
footing. This legislation also created, for the first time, some form of oversight of the 
agencies, with the establishment of commissioners to monitor the issuing of warrants 
to interfere with property and communications, and the creation of a committee of 
parliamentarians, the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), to examine the 
„administration, policy and expenditure‟ of the intelligence and security agencies.   
 
However, whilst parliament‟s contribution to the oversight of the intelligence and 
security agencies is central to providing them with democratic legitimacy and 
accountability (Cabinet Office, 2002), and its role in the scrutiny of legislation and 
policy relating to the use of intelligence is growing, the current system raises a 
number of questions including around the effectiveness of the ISC, the broader role of 
parliament and parliamentarians, and their ability to scrutinise the agencies and the 
government‟s use of intelligence. 
 
The Intelligence and Security Committee 
 
The establishment of the ISC was a significant step in the development of 
parliamentary oversight of the British intelligence and security agencies. It operates 
within the „ring of secrecy‟ and has therefore for the first time allowed MPs and Peers 
to have wide-ranging access to the intelligence and security agencies, documents and 
staff. The ISC sets its own agenda and, although its proceedings remain secret, it 
publishes annual reports, and has also produced a number of additional reports on 
subjects of its own choosing. Although its mandate is limited to the examination of 
the „administration, policy and expenditure‟ of the intelligence and security agencies, 
the Committee has shown an increasing propensity to consider operational matters, 
and some recent studies have argued that it has exceeded expectations in terms of 
access to information and established itself as a serious critic of the agencies, for 
example, with reports on the handling of detainees by British intelligence personnel in 
Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq (Gill and Phythian, 2006; Glees, Davies and 
Morrison, 2006; Phythian 2007).  
 
However, the ISC does not provide parliamentary oversight as it is generally 
understood with regard to other policy areas. Indeed, it is something of a 
constitutional anomaly, being a committee of parliamentarians, but not a committee of 
parliament. Unlike select committees the ISC is a statutory committee, the members 
of which are appointed by the Prime Minister after consultation with opposition 
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leaders. It meets in secret within the Cabinet Office and is staffed by Cabinet Office 
officials rather than parliamentary clerks. It has no power to require the agencies to 
provide information, and it reports directly to the Prime Minister, who is able to 
censor its reports before they are laid before parliament. The Committee‟s anomalous 
status has led a number of observers to argue that it does little to make the intelligence 
and security agencies more accountable, noting in particular that the separation of the 
Committee from parliament, and its real and symbolic proximity to the executive and 
the agencies it is designed to scrutinise, has compromised its independence 
(Lustgarten and Leigh, 1994; Weir and Beetham, 1999; Gill 2007). Some have argued 
that the Prime Minister‟s broad powers to censor reports before publication could be 
used to prevent the disclosure of matters that involve some abuse of functions or 
scandals (Wadham, 1994). Questions have also been raised about the ISC‟s reliance 
on the agencies to supply information in response to requests from the Committee, 
and the role of ministers acting as „gatekeepers‟ in the provision of that information 
(Wadham, 1994; Gill, 1996). These concerns have been reinforced by reports from 
the ISC itself about a lack of candour on the part of Ministers (ISC, 2003), and 
prominent recent cases in which the Committee has revisited earlier enquiries to take 
account of  material which was not made available to them at the time of their original 
investigations (ISC, 2009a, 2009b). 
 
Perceived weaknesses in the structure and work of the ISC have been used to 
reinforce calls for its replacement with a parliamentary select committee (for example, 
Phythian, 2007). Although proposals for a select committee on intelligence predate 
the creation of the ISC, recent statements on both sides of the House suggest that the 
issue has risen up the political agenda. Proposals for changes to the handling of 
intelligence by government and the oversight of intelligence by parliament have been 
made in statements by the Conservative Shadow Secretary of State for Home Affairs, 
and in the Conservative Party‟s national security green paper (Conservative Party, 
2009), whilst the Government‟s proposals for constitutional reform have conceded 
that because the ISC‟s reports, „are prepared under separate arrangements and the 
Committee meets only in private, some argue that the process is insufficiently 
transparent‟, and as a result proposed a number of changes to the way in which the 
ISC operates, including public hearings, greater transparency in appointments, and 
reviewing the way in which the committee works with parliamentary select 
committees (Ministry of Justice, 2007).  
 
The wider role of parliament 
 
The Government‟s proposals for reform of the ISC may be seen as a response to a 
growth in parliamentary interest in the work of the intelligence and security agencies 
and in the Government‟s use of intelligence. One consequence of the existence of the 
ISC has been an increase in the number of parliamentarians with in-depth knowledge 
of the work of the agencies. It has also increased the number of opportunities for 
parliamentarians to debate intelligence issues, with ISC reports having been the 
subject of an annual debate in the House of Commons since 1998, and in the House of 
Lords from 2009.   
 
The ISC may also be seen to have stimulated parliamentary interest in others ways. A 
number of parliamentary select committees have sought to carry out their own 
investigations in areas already scrutinised by the ISC, with the Foreign Affairs 
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Committee‟s investigation into the government‟s presentation of the case for war in 
Iraq (FAC, 2004) and the Joint Committee on Human Rights investigation into 
allegations that UK intelligence personnel were complicit in torture (JCHR, 2009) 
both highlighting perceived limitations in the work of the ISC. Indeed, the 
government‟s own decision to appoint an independent committee chaired by Lord 
Butler to examine intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was seen by 
some as a tacit acceptance that the ISC lacks legitimacy (Leigh, 2005). Similarly, the 
Home Affairs Committee (1999), the Foreign Affairs Committee (2004), and the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (2006) have all called for greater accountability and 
parliamentary oversight of the intelligence and security agencies, including the 
replacement of the ISC with a parliamentary select committee. There is also some 
evidence of growing interest in House of Lords in the scrutiny of intelligence issues, 
including in 2009 its first ever debate on the work of the Intelligence and Security 
Committee. The House of Lords also contains a significant body of expertise on 
intelligence, with eleven former members of the ISC now sitting in the House of 
Lords, along with former Government ministers and individuals from senior ranks in 
the armed forces, who have direct experience of handling intelligence material. 
Recent appointments have also brought into the House Peers with direct experience of 
the agencies, most notably Pauline Neville-Jones, former Chair of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee, and Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former Director General 
of MI5. 
 
However, whilst there is evidence of some growth in parliamentary interest in 
intelligence it is not clear whether parliament has the capacity to provide effective 
oversight of the intelligence and security agencies. A number of scholars have 
observed that with few votes or debates, and consequently little opportunity for 
personal recognition or political advantage, there is little incentive for 
parliamentarians to take an interest in matters relating to intelligence. Perhaps as a 
result of this, some have identified a lack of expertise among parliamentarians on 
intelligence issues (Lustgarten and Leigh, 1994; Robertson, 1998; Defty 2008). This 
may have an impact upon the work of the ISC, as access to information is in part 
dependent on the ability to know which questions to ask. As parliamentarians make 
up the Government, it may also have an impact on the effective use of intelligence in 
policymaking, as observed by the Butler inquiry (Butler, 2004). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Despite recent developments, Parliament‟s capacity to provide effective oversight of 
the intelligence and security issues is not clear. Whilst the establishment and 
development of the ISC has been a significant change, a number of observers in 
parliament and beyond have identified limitations to the Committee‟s ability to 
provide effective scrutiny. 
 
However, the focus on the role and nature of the ISC arguably serves to confuse 
debates over the extent to which parliament is able to scrutinise intelligence issues. 
Whilst changes to the Committee may improve its ability to provide oversight of the 
agencies, it is parliament as a whole which is required to scrutinise the Government‟s 
use of intelligence, as for example, in making the case for war in Iraq. In recent years 
a number of bodies have brought forward recommendations for strengthening 
parliament, including the Hansard Society‟s Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny 
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(2001), the Conservative Party‟s Commission to Strengthen Parliament (2000), the 
House of Commons Modernisation Committee (2002). If future governments are 
likely to want to continue to use intelligence to garner public and parliamentary 
support for policy, and given the importance of parliament in providing legitimacy to 
the work of the intelligence and security agencies, it is perhaps important that debates 
about parliament‟s ability and role in scrutinising them and their work, should be 
discussed more widely and linked more closely to other proposals for parliamentary 
reform.  
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